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THE DEMAND FOR MACRO PROJECTS AND THE 
ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT 
 
Mark Sawoski, Professor of International Relations, Roger Williams University  
                                                        
 “If you talk to Palestinians and Israelis—and I talk to them all the time—
government officials, private citizens—there is a vast consensus among both 
sides about how it’s going to end.”  
Former US Senator George Mitchell, Chairman, 
Sharm El-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee1
  
Once again, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is at a turning point.  Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s 
plan unilaterally to withdraw from the Gaza Strip and part of the West Bank, while on the surface 
an act of frustration born of the perceived absence of a genuine negotiating partner, is effectively 
breaking the stalemate that has existed between the parties since January 2001.  At that time, 
Israeli and Palestinian negotiators, meeting at Taba, Egypt, came closer than ever before to a 
settlement.  Yes, there were still some substantial disagreements, including legitimate reasons for 
the Palestinians to turn down the proposed “deal.”2  However, the main lines of an agreement 
were plain to see.  They are: 
-- Security for Israel; 
-- Complete Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip; 
-- Israeli withdrawal from most of the West Bank, probably with some pre-war  
1967 Israeli land given to the Palestinians; 
-- Making Palestine a contiguous state:  Connecting the West Bank and Gaza; 
-- Economic development for Israel and Palestine; 
-- Some acknowledgement of a “right of return” for Palestinians, perhaps in the  
form of compensation; 
-- Sharing Jerusalem. 
 
Of course, the Sharon government is not advocating new negotiations.  It is publicly set on a 
unilateral course to put in place a weak Palestinian homeland, walled-off from and dominated by 
Israel.  Sharon, himself, in a recent interview with Haaretz, described his policy as “a blow to the 
Palestinians, in that it will force them to give up on their aspirations for many years to come, 
until a new leadership emerges on their side that is ready to fight terror.”3  However, in going 
forward with it, Sharon, intentionally or not, once again puts the Taba negotiations front and 
center.  The main problem since 2001, from the perspective of those in favor of a settlement, has 
been getting the negotiations restarted—and, in effect, Sharon’s new policy does exactly that.  
(See the end of this paper for more on this point.) 
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This conference, therefore, comes at a timely moment.  The demand for outside help—for “macro 
projects” in particular—is great.  Both sides acknowledge this.  Palestinian Authority (PA) 
Foreign Minister Sha'ath, who is due in Washington on April 21st, a week after Sharon’s visit, 
will take the opportunity to request “massive economic support” through the World Bank and 
other donors.4  Sharon, for his part, had Simon Peres “promote the idea of international aid for 
the rehabilitation of Gaza and the development of the Negev” at a meeting with World Bank 
President James Wolfensohn during a visit to the US the week of March 28th.5  The question is 
how might macro projects help facilitate movement toward a settlement?  Or, given that we 
generally know how it will end, what is the demand for specific projects? 
 
 We see the demand as follows: 
-- Projects facilitating the relocation of Israeli setters from Gaza and the West  
Bank, including economic development; 
-- A project connecting the West Bank and Gaza; 
-- Projects promoting economic development of Palestinian areas; 
-- Projects providing new housing for Palestinians, potentially including  
Palestinian returnees; 
  -- Projects facilitating the shared use of Jerusalem. 
 
Relocation of Israeli Settlers 
 
Israel is poised to withdraw from all of Gaza and a large part of the West Bank.  Some 7,500 
Israeli settlers live in Gaza and some 187,000 live in the West Bank.  (See:  Study group paper #3:  
“Who are the Settlers?”)  This means that housing—and incentives—need to be found to facilitate 
the relocation of all the settlers from the Gaza immediately and, potentially, a large number from 
the West Bank as well.  Under the Clinton plan, which was “accepted” by both parties with major  
reservations at Taba, some 59,089 Israeli settlers in the West Bank would need to be relocated.  In 
contrast, the controversial security “fence” currently being built by the Israeli Ministry of 
Defense, if continued as recently modified6--and transformed into an actual border--would leave 
some 53,724 Israelis otherwise situated on the Palestinian side.7  
 
Clearly, providing Israeli settlers with attractive alternatives to their current living conditions in 
Gaza and the West Bank would go a long way toward facilitating a positive end to the conflict.   
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Suitable housing in Israel proper is problematic, particularly given its scarcity and because most 
settlers are accustomed to owning their own homes—as well as receiving special government 
benefits reserved for settlers.  A better option is to create new housing (and employment) 
opportunities either by further development of the Negev desert or by one or more of several 
schemes for creating new land from the sea.  For more on the Negev idea, and a possible 
marriage between new settlements in the Negev and the sea-based schemes, see:  Study group 
paper #2:  “The Negev Desert:  A Viable Israeli Resettlement Option?”8   
 
As noted, foreign support for new development projects in the Negev is currently being sought 
by the Sharon Government as a high priority, with Simon Peres making just this case recently to 
the president of the World Bank at Sharon’s request.    
 
Making Palestine a Contiguous State:  Connecting the West Bank and Gaza 
 
Safe passage between Gaza and the West Bank was accepted by both sides in the Oslo Accords—
and again at Taba.  The issue is extremely important to the Palestinians, who seek a united state.  
When safe passage was made available in 1999 via a land corridor, it was reportedly greeted with 
genuine enthusiasm by many Palestinians.9  Most importantly, a macro project connecting Gaza 
and the West Bank would facilitate much needed economic development in the territories (See:  
Study group paper #5 “Economic Transformation and Development in Palestine”)—in particular, 
it would directly contribute to the economic success of a seaport macro project in Gaza. 
 
From Israel’s perspective, the key question is one of security.  Under current proposals, including 
under Taba, Israel would provide security.  Moreover, Israel has been steadfast about refusing to 
yield sovereignty, although Israeli negotiators did propose that Palestinian use of the safe 
passage route count as one of the territorial swaps for Israeli annexation of West Bank land.10   
 
These concerns suggest that a bridge or a tunnel would be preferable to surface schemes.  A 
bridge plan was proposed in 1999 by then Israeli Prime Minister-elect Ehud Barak, but it fell 
through for lack of financing.  Given heightened security concerns today, a rapid rail link (via 
bridge or tunnel) would perhaps make the most sense.  It would need to have the capability, 
however, to move real freight; specifically, to move secure shipping containers.  
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The distance involved, if based on the lower route accepted at Taba, is not prohibitive: Roughly 
25 miles, or 47 kilometers.11  For more information, see:  Study group paper # 4:  “Connecting the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip:  Questions of ‘Safe Passage.” 
 
Economic Development in Palestine 
 
The importance of projects in this category is indicated by the emphasis which Sharon places on 
economic development in the Gaza specifically, as being necessary to the success of the planned 
withdrawal.  As noted, “rehabilitation of Gaza,” together with economic development of the 
Negev, were the two major investment areas which Sharon asked Simon Peres specifically to 
promote with the president of the World Bank two weeks ago.  It therefore deserves treatment by 
itself. 
 
 The prospect of a major international commitment to economic development in the territories 
has been on the table since at least the Clinton Administration when Secretary of Commerce Ron 
Brown led a major investment mission there.  It is a key incentive for Palestinians to make peace 
with Israel.  To the extent that such efforts promote Palestinian moderation, it is also very much 
in Israel’s interest to have them.     
 
The demand is made greater by the steady deterioration of Palestinian economic conditions since 
the onset of the al-Aqsa intifada in September 2000—and Israel’s severing of work permits since 
then by some seventy-five percent.  (See: Study group paper #5:  “Economic Transformation and 
Development in Palestine.”)  The effect has been a collapse of the Palestinian economy, 
increased unemployment and a generally deteriorating quality-of-life for most Palestinians.  
Among other things, this has had the especially negative effect of retargeting foreign assistance 
away from infrastructure projects and toward humanitarian aid.  In part because of the restrictive 
Israeli closure policies brought on by the intifada, “between October 2000 and July 2001, only 8 
percent of international donor aid was spent on projects to build medium-term capacity or 
infrastructure.  By year-end 2001, 70 percent of foreign aid disbursements went toward PA 
budgetary support and emergency funding for humanitarian aid.”12  The situation has only 
worsened since then. 
 
Obviously, the need for economic development becomes even greater the longer Israel cuts itself 
off economically from Gaza and the West Bank.  Ironically, such economic development becomes  
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more and more in Israel’s interest too, the more its policies lead to a formally separated divorce, 
rather than a settlement. 
  
Hence, the demand for such macro projects as being proposed at this conference for the 
development of an industrial park in Egypt near its border with Gaza and for the longer-term 
development of a port facility for Gaza is clearly great—from the perspective of both Palestinian 
and Israeli interests.  So too is the related demand—in economic terms— for a project connecting 
Gaza with the West Bank. 
 
 
Providing New Housing for Palestinians, Potentially Including: 
 
Palestinian Returnees: There is great need for housing in Gaza in particular.  Some 450,000 
Palestinians, out of a total of 1.1 million in Gaza, currently live in camps; this, within a relatively 
small area.13  Suitable macro projects would be likely, therefore, to promote Palestinian positive 
feelings toward a long-term solution with Israel—as well as, significantly, the political 
establishment of a younger, pragmatic, still secular, although unacceptably violence-prone, 
generation of Palestinian leaders.  (See:  Study group paper #8:  “Who Speaks for Palestine?  
The Political Struggle for Gaza”) 
 
One way such housing could be provided would be through a macro-project which develops 
portions of the desert lying along the Gaza Strip for Palestinian use as part of one or more land 
swaps for territory in the West Bank.  Indeed, the Barak government specifically offered the 
Halutza sand region along the southern border of Gaza to the Palestinians in 2000.  The Halutza 
is a part of the Negev desert, some 78 square miles in size.  It is about half the size of the Gaza 
Strip.  The Palestinians turned down the Halutza in 2000 as being not as valuable as the land they 
were being asked to give up in the West Bank—and also because they were being asked to give 
up much more territory than Halutza contained.  The Israelis reportedly broke ground for a 
settlement there in August, 2003.  But this does not mean that some part of it—or other desert 
land contiguous to Gaza—could not still be developed for Palestinian use.  (See:  Study paper # 
6:  “Home, Home Again:  Palestinian Refugees and a Halutza-like Swap.”)  
 
The desert communities being proposed at this conference would obviously be suitable either as 
part of a land swap or simply located within Palestinian territory. Providing such housing would  
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also help address the Palestinian insistence on the right of return for the roughly 3.8 million 
Palestinian refugees in the region.  This is a central issue for the Palestinians—and one on which  
the Israelis can not fully yield.  However, both sides agreed at Taba “that a comprehensive and 
just solution is essential to creating a lasting and morally  scrupulous peace.”14  For its part, Israel 
in 2000 stated it was prepared to accept at least some refugees as part of family reunification  
program.  The Palestinians stated that the right of return “should be implemented in a manner 
that protected Israel’s demographic and security interests by limiting the number of returnees.”15  
The possibility of providing compensation was also a part of these negotiations.  Both sides, in 
other words, have demonstrated some flexibility in addressing “right of return” in the past, 
although Sharon today is steadfast against it.16  Clearly, suitable macro projects, perhaps 
providing housing in Halutza-like settings or otherwise creating economic activity which could 
be used for compensation (for example, offering shares in some new enterprise) could play a 
positive role.  It is highly unlikely there will ever be a long-term settlement without this issue 
being addressed. 
 
Sharing Jerusalem 
 
While the parties came closer to resolving Jerusalem in 2000, serious issues remained unsettled, 
including final disposition of the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount.  We believe that creative 
macro projects could make a difference here as well, particularly with respect to sharing sites that 
are sacred to many.  In this regard, both sides noted at Taba that progress was being made on 
“practical arrangements” relating to management of the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount, 
including “evacuations, building and public order in the area of the compound.”17  This suggests 
that such macro projects would not be unrealistic. 
 
A Propitious Moment for Macro Projects 
 
Sharon’s unilateral withdrawal plan restarts the negotiations because it breaks the stalemate 
created by the insistence on reciprocity made under the so-called “road map” peace plan backed 
by the US.18  It does so, secondly, because core elements of the unfinished Taba “deal” are 
reflected in Sharon’s policy, especially as the security fence being built by Israel adheres more 
closely to the pre-war 1967 “Green Line” between Israel and the West Bank; this under recent US 
pressure;19 and, thirdly, because, as Sharon, himself, publicly states, a final agreement with the 
Palestinians is preferable to unilateral actions alone,20 suggesting that, Israel is ready for 
negotiations, if only a genuine negotiating partner can be found—something that will also take a  
 
Volume 1               Center for Macro Projects and Diplomacy Working Paper Series                 Spring 2004               
                                                                                                                                                 
 20
 
new governing coalition in Israel.  (Not an unlikely prospect:  See:  Study group paper #7 “Israeli 
Politics—What’s Ahead?” and below.)  In other words, Sharon’s new policy may be better  
conceived of as a new Israeli negotiating gambit—albeit one with real and immediate 
consequences-- rather than an abandonment of negotiations.  Indeed, the PA appears to be 
treating it this way.  The PA, and other important players, such as Mohammad Dahlan, the man 
most likely to be the key player in Gaza after Israel withdraws (See:  Study group paper #8 “Who  
Speaks for Palestine?  The Political Struggle for Gaza”), are welcoming the withdrawal provided 
that no concessions are made that would compromise their position at future talks.21   
 
Then there is the United States:  It is now using some of its considerable leverage on Israel to get 
expanded withdrawal from the West Bank, as well as Gaza and otherwise bring the parties closer 
to Taba.  In return, Washington will reportedly accept a permanent Israeli presence in at least a 
part of the West Bank, a move that is consistent with previous negotiations.  This month, 
Washington or, alternatively, the President’s ranch in Crawford, Texas, will be visited by:  
Sharon,  PA Foreign Minister Nabil Sha'ath, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, Jordan’s King 
Abdullah, and British Prime Minister Tony Blair.  This looks like a “negotiation,”22 even if the PA 
wants it known that Sha’ath’s meetings with US government officials will be part of a “private 
visit.”23  
 
Sharon’s new policy is also likely to shake up politics in the region in a way that could be 
favorable to a long-term settlement along the lines of Taba.  In particular, the announced 
withdrawal from Gaza: (1) Has already accelerated a critical power struggle within the 
Palestinian leadership, especially in Gaza, which, while risky, seems likely to favor younger, 
more pragmatic and still mostly secular Palestinians, such as Mohammad Dahlan (See:  Study 
group paper #8 “Who Speaks for Palestine:  The Political Struggle for Gaza”) – the downside is 
that the younger generation itself is violence-prone and that it may also lead to some governing 
role for Hamas and other terrorists (See:  Study group paper #9:  “Palestinian Terrorist 
Organizations”); and (2) Is likely to lead to the withdrawal of hardliners from Sharon’s 
government, the collapse of the current coalition, and a return to a Likud-Labor coalition (See:  
Study group paper #7  “Israeli Politics—What’s Ahead?”)—indeed, there are already contacts on 
this between Sharon’s representatives and Labor24—and Sharon and Peres, in the past few weeks, 
keep telling people both publicly and privately that they have deep and abiding respect for one 
another.  Note the following exchange: 
 Haaretz:  Do you miss Peres in the government? 
 Prime Minister Sharon:  Political life is not a matter of [personal] longings. 
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. . . . if there are parties that want to leave the coalition, I will not  
leave the country without a government, and I will not take the 
people to elections.  I will set up another government.25
 
For these reasons, we see the timing of this conference as propitious.  We believe there is a 
specific demand, right now, for macro projects such as those identified in this paper. Please see 
the other study group papers for more information. 
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A PARTIAL HISTORY OF PALESTINE 
Karl Sabbagh, Author and Television Producer 
 
The phrase ‘New Land for Peace’ is the starting point for this conference and I’d like to explain 
something about the land, and something about why there isn’t peace there at the moment. In 
that way we’ll be able to see a little more clearly whether there are ways in which major 
engineering projects had help to address the problem that has challenged the world’s use of 
diplomacy so much over the last fifty years. 
 
The whole of the territory we are talking about – nowadays known as Israel, the West Bank and 
Gaza – used to be called Palestine. It was a beautiful cultivated land, with gentle hills, ancient 
towns, scattered villages and rushing streams. Every time I visit the area, I marvel at the beauty 
of the country – and at the relatively low population density once you get away from the coastal 
strip. People sometimes talk as if there is only room for one of the two competing peoples in this 
small territory. This may be the case, but it is not literal room that is lacking. There is no room for 
the two peoples - Jews and Arabs - in the same way there is no room in Yankee stadium for a lion 
and a gazelle. Plenty of space but no room. 
 
In my experience, many people are unaware of the history of the relationship between the land 
and the peoples of Palestine. I am going to call the territory Palestine because it has been 
Palestine for the last three hundred years, up till 1948, and I will be talking specifically about the 
events before 1948 that led to the dispossession of the Palestinians. I’ll therefore be dealing with 
history and geography. 
 
Much modern discourse concentrates on the last fifty years in Palestine, the years since it became 
Israel, but for the Palestinians it is the events before that which are the key to the problem. No 
peaceful solution can ignore the history and geography of those events. 
 
There are five different aspects of the two claims to the territory we are discussing. The first is the 
religious basis of claims to the land.  
 
Jews - at least religious Jews - claim that the land of Israel was promised them by their god. I 
won’t at this stage go into the merits of each claim, I’m merely telling you what is put forward 
seriously by members of the two societies, and there are plenty of Jews, particularly among those 
 23
